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Charles’s paper starts with the problems created by the divergence between a highly integrated 
global economy and the fact that political legitimacy, and in particular the legitimacy of 
regulation, taxation, public expenditure and fiscal transfer, resides at national level.  
The problem that “a global trading and financial system coexists with national sovereignty over 
political and fiscal powers”. 
He notes, as many have, that logic would drive us in one of two opposite directions. 
  Towards more global or regional political integration. 
  Or towards more national control of economic and financial processes through, for 
instance, subsidiarisation of banks by country and, possibly, capital controls. 
But any movement towards the latter option is in Europe’s case “likely to be limited “,  given the 
adamant commitment of the European Union to the existence of a single market, including a free 
flow of capital “despite the  role that such capital flows have played in the current crisis there”.  
Indeed, as Charles says, “it is in the EU, and even more so in the Eurozone, that the conflict, the 
fault-line between supranational and national, reaches its most extreme.” 
It is on these issues of the appropriate balance of national and supranational within the EU, and 
specifically within the Eurozone, that I would like to focus my response today. 
As Charles notes, the Maastricht Treaty was intended to ensure appropriate fiscal discipline at 
what he labels the “subsidiary sovereign” level.  And that phrase, “subsidiary sovereign”, 
usefully focuses our attention on the highly specific feature of the Eurozone – which is the 
existence of political units which are clearly “subsidiary” in that they do not have currency 
issuing powers, but which in their fiscal activities, and in the scale of their fiscal revenues and 
expenditures as a percent of GDP, seem like fully sovereign states.  
The Maastricht Treaty was intended to address the tensions created by this specific feature. But 
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positions, ignoring the problems potentially created by private sector indebtedness, indebtedness 
which might well find its counterpart in external current account deficits. 
That clearly, however, poses the question: do external current account deficits matter, and if so 
why? And in particular, do they matter and why within the single currency zone?  For there has 
always been a school of thought which says that external current account deficits produced by 
and financed by private debt flows do not matter.  Nigel Lawson argued in the 1980s, for 
instance, that we need to draw a clear distinction between external deficits arising from fiscal 
deficits and those arising from “consenting adults” in private contracts (quoted in William Cline, 
“International Debt Reexamined”).
1 
It is therefore on this issue of what categories of debt matter – external or internal, public or 
private – that I will concentrate today, seeking to identify the relevant specific character of the 
Eurozone in this respect, and ending with a proposal for what the Maastricht Treaty should have 
said to achieve a coherent balance of national and supranational roles within the Eurozone single 
currency. 
Do external accounting balances matter in either stock or flow term?  Should we, in other words, 
consider the aggregate of the external indebtedness (gross or net) of all counterparties in a 
country – the state, the households and corporates – or should be consider their indebtedness as 
quite separate issues? At several points in his paper Charles talks of a “country” being indebted – 
defining the “country” balance sheet as the aggregate of state, household and corporate sectors.  
But is “country” actually a useful aggregation?  
To analyse that question it is useful to consider the different answers which most commentators 
would give and have in the past given when considering two different cases: 
  the emerging markets which got into unsustainable debt positions in the 1980s – in 
particular in Latin America; 
  or an individual state within the US, say, California. 
In relation to the first, almost all commentators at the time assumed that what mattered was the 
aggregate external balance.  Indeed both at the time and in subsequent historical accounts, that 
assumption has been so dominant as to be often unstated.  Thus for instance in William Cline‘s 
classic account of the 1980s emerging markets debt crisis (“International Debt Reexamined”), 
almost all of the figures given are for the total external balance (whether in stock or flow terms) 
with only imperfect and incomplete data distinguishing between public and private 
counterparties, and with no comprehensive data on the domestic internal indebtedness of either 
private or public sectors.  The focus is on the combined indebtedness of public and private 
sectors, but only on their external indebtedness. The assumption is that what matters is the 
aggregate external position and the resource flows required to service that debt. 
At the other extreme, consider the case of California (or any other US state). Within California 
different counterparties could be in debt – the state of California, Californian households, or 
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corporate businesses or banks registered in California.  And there could be concerns about the 
sustainability of those categories of debt.  But in this case, almost no one ever calculates the 
aggregate (“country”) debt of California, combining the debt of each of these sectors.     
Conversely, when we do think separately about the sustainability of the debt of each of these 
sectors (or of specific counterparties within these sectors) we make no distinction between 
whether this debt is held by investors within California or out of state.   
  We therefore do not calculate and worry about the overall current account balance of 
California as a “country”. 
  Nor is it usually considered relevant whether the debt of Californian corporates is held by 
Californian households and institutions or by institutions and households in other states 
of the US. 
  Nor whether Californian state debt is held by investors within state or without. 
Thus, (Exhibit 1): 
  While in the Latin American case the usual focus was on external debt only but on the 
level of external debt aggregated across all sectors. 
  Analysis of debt sustainability for Californian counterparties is typically considered 
sector by sector, but with no particular importance attached to the distinction between 
whether that debt is held internally or externally. 
So was that approach to Latin America debt appropriate?  Is this approach to the debt of different 
Californian sectors appropriate?  And should we think about Eurozone countries as we thought 
about emerging market countries in the 1980s, or as we typically think about individual US 
states? 
The argument for considering Californian sectoral debt burdens quite separately is that their 
sustainability appears to be quite separate (Exhibit 2):  
  No sector has guaranteed the debt of any other sector.   
  Californian householders could be in payment difficulties even if the state were 
financially sound, and vice versa.   
  Credit worthy households in California might well be able to get access to credit provided 
by banks either within or outside California, even in the midst of a Californian state debt 
default.  
  And indebted corporates or banks which happen to be headquartered in California could 
be quite able to service their debt even if the state of California went bankrupt.  In the 
US, nobody assumes that the credit rating of the corporate cannot exceed the credit rating 
of the state or city in which it is headquartered.  And the bankrupt state of California 
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  As a result, when New York City teetered on the brink of bankruptcy in 1975, it was not 
assumed that had necessary consequences for the solvency of banks or corporates which 
happened to be headquartered in New York City. 
The logic against aggregating the debt levels of counterparties/sectors which happen to be 
located in a specific state therefore seems clear: why should we aggregate the debt positions (in 
either stock or flow terms) of different sectors which are not cross-guarantors and whose 
economic prospects are not necessary correlated?  In general, it seems we have good reasons not 
to work out current account balances or net external balance sheet positions for individual US 
States. 
2 
But the reference to the “correlation” of economic and debt sustainability prospects suggests that 
in some circumstances and to some degree it might actually be useful to look at aggregate debt 
levels for all Californian sectors – public and private; and perhaps also to look at external 
aggregate imbalances.  Because in several ways sectoral debt sustainability prospects might be 
correlated, with correlation flowing both from public to private and private to public (Exhibit 3). 
  If private household debt has driven property price inflation and a construction boom, and 
if state revenues are highly dependent on property prices and transactions as well as on 
the general buoyancy of economic activity, then high and rising levels of private 
household debt might indicate future problems for state finances when the bubble bursts.  
  And if state debt is in danger of becoming unsustainable, then the state might in future 
have to increase taxes and reduce expenditures, which could undermine the debt 
servicing capacity of private households and businesses. 
  And a current account deficit funded from outside the state, while in some circumstances 
reflecting capital flows which finance revenue generating investments, could in other 
cases indicate that real wages have been driven above competitive levels in the traded 
sector of the economy because of a debt financed expansion of non-traded sectors (such 
as construction).  A divergence of real wages which, if the construction boom turns to 
bust, will then result in some mix of:  
-  Unemployment if real wages cannot flexibly adjust to restore 
competitiveness. 
-  Increased real debt burdens if real wages do flexibly adjust, cutting wages 
relative to debt levels. 
-  With consequent pressures on state revenue and state debt sustainability as 
well as on private debt sustainability in either of these cases. 
                                                            
2 Indeed it is possible that if we had worked out current account deficits for US states over the course of the last 50 
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Thus, while the presumption that we should not add up sectoral debt levels to produce a 
“country” aggregate for individual US states has considerable power, even in these 
circumstances we must recognise that sectoral debt sustainabilities might be somewhat 
correlated, and that if they are correlated then there is some value in considering their aggregate 
cross-sectoral size. 
The general criterion for useful aggregation therefore is the degree to which different sectoral 
prospects are inter-related or correlated.  And the reason it made sense in the 1980s emerging 
debt crisis to focus on aggregate debt and on external debt was that there were specific factors 
which justified that focus (Exhibit 4). 
  First, there was a high degree of correlation between state and corporate debt prospects.  
This resulted not only from the factors which apply even in the case of an individual US 
state, but also additional factors specific to emerging market economies at that time.  
-  The fact that much apparently “corporate” debt was in fact due from para-
statal organisations. 
-  The fact that access to foreign exchange to service private debt might be 
dependent on government capital control and exchange rate policies which 
could in turn be influenced by the sustainability of the government’s own 
external debt position. 
-  The reasonable suspicion of private credit providers that still imperfectly 
democratic states might use sovereign powers to seize private assets if 
needed to service its own debt.  
-  And a resulting danger that even inherently credit worthy private projects 
might become unfundable amid concerns about the state’s credit 
worthiness, so that a government wishing to ensure a continued flow of 
credit to the private sector might have to guarantee or take over the private 
debts – as the Argentinean and Chilean states effectively did in the early 
1980s
3. 
These special conditions are what make William Cline’s almost exclusive focus on 
aggregate country debt sensible.   
  Equally, there were some specific factors which appeared to make a predominant focus 
on external rather than internal debt justified.  
-  External debt was foreign currency debt which, unlike domestic currency 
debt, could not in extremis be monetised away. 
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-  And it was assumed that access to external debt was particularly important 
in order to finance net real resources flows without which economic 
development and growth would be hampered.  
Together, these factors provide some justification for the focus on the external position 
alone – though with the caveat that internal state debt levels might still be relevant if they 
had consequences for the ability of the state to service its total combined debt (internal 
and external) out of real tax resources rather using the monetisation route to reduce the 
domestic element. 
So (Exhibit 5) both the tendency of 1980s analysis to focus on aggregate country external debt 
and the tendency of most analysts to ignore the current account flows or aggregate balance sheets 
of US states are largely, though not entirely, justified by the different circumstances.  There is a 
spectrum of different circumstances which justifies a spectrum of analytical approaches. 
Where within the spectrum should we locate Eurozone economies? Should we focus on their 
external balances as we did on those of emerging economies in the 1980s? Or focus solely on 
state finances, treating for instance the debts of Greek shipping owners as utterly separate from 
the Greek state?   
The crucial issue is the extent to which the debt sustainability prospects of different sectors are 
correlated.  Analysis of that correlation within the Eurozone argues, I suggest, for three things:  
  (i) A far stronger focus than under Maastricht on aggregate debt levels, looking at the 
combined debt levels of all sectors. 
  (ii) A considerable focus on external imbalances as potentially important indicators;  
  (iii) but also and crucially the need to avoid taking false comfort from a balanced 
external position within which debt is primarily internally financed. 
(i)  Strong focus on aggregate debt levels 
We now recognise that high private sector debt levels within the Eurozone can make state 
finances vulnerable. (Exhibit 6) This is for the same reasons which could theoretically apply 
even in the case of a US state, but with added importance in the Eurozone due to the absence of 
automatically stabilising fiscal transfers, and the much larger fiscal role which Europeans states 
play compared with US states.  US states tax and spend on average about 5% to 10% of GDP: 
they finance neither Medicare/Medicate nor social security.  Eurozone states tax and spend 
somewhere in the region of 35% to 45% of GDP.  As a result, the fall in Eurozone national 
revenues as a percentage of GDP which will occur following a property bust, is likely to be much 
larger than in the case of a US state, and any fiscal consolidation to offset an emerging deficit is 
in turn likely to have a larger depressive effect on the country/state economy.   
This absence of automatic fiscal transfers and larger size of the state are, I suspect, more 
important differences between Eurozone countries and US states, than the frequently mentioned 
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because the unemployed may emigrate; negative because tax payers may migrate away from the 
increased tax rates required to achieve fiscal consolidation.  
(ii)  Focus on external imbalances as indicators 
Equally, we need to place greater weight on external current account imbalances than we did pre-
crisis, though more as indicators of problems than as direct “financing challenges”. (Exhibit 7) 
  A current account imbalance can represent a “financing challenge” for a country if the 
attitude of external creditors to the credit worthiness of, say, a well-run Spanish company 
is influenced by creditor beliefs that in extremis all debts are linked, e.g, 
-  Because a Spanish government unable to pay its debts may leave the 
Eurozone and in doing so not only re-denominate its own debt but those of 
its corporates in New Peseta. 
-  And/or if it is believed that the Spanish state in order to pay its debts will 
impose unavoidable taxes on the credit worthy Spanish company, and/or 
impose capital controls. 
-  i.e. if debt sustainability prospects are closely inter-related.
4   
These are the sort of concerns which made the concept of “country” financability relevant 
in 1980s emerging markets.  In extremis they could apply in a Eurozone under extreme 
stress. 
  But even if the danger of such an absolute financing constraint is slight, external 
imbalances are certainly important indicators of potential problems, and in the case of, 
for instance, Spain and Ireland, should have been treated as indicators of disequilibrium 
in real wage competitiveness which were likely, once the construction booms bust, to 
result in high unemployment and rapidly rising state debts even in countries which during 
the boom appeared to have strong state finances.  
(iii)  Avoid taking false comfort from internal debt financing 
So external imbalances may matter and should certainly be carefully monitored.  But conversely, 
the absence of external imbalances should not be taken as indicating that high levels of state, 
private or aggregate debt pose no challenges.  For indeed, if we go back to the crucial question of 
whether debt sustainability prospects in different sectors are correlated, it is clear that large 
internal holdings of state (or other debt) can in some cases create greater vulnerability than large 
external holdings.  Thus (Exhibit 8): 
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  Suppose California, through some variant of default / renegotiation / restructuring, 
imposed a haircut on holders of the state debt.  The impact of that on the Californian 
economy would almost certainly be greater if a large proportion of that debt were held by 
Californian households and institutions rather than held out of the state, because the 
impact on those debt holders’ wealth and in turn their consumption decisions would 
produce a further negative impact on California’s state revenue. 
  And the impact would probably be greatest if a large proportion of that defaulting state 
debt were held by Californian banks, and particularly if those banks held so much state 
debt that their solvency was undermined by state default. 
In the Eurozone, one of our greatest vulnerabilities derives precisely from the fact that large 
proportions of national debt are held internally within each country by the banks of that country.  
It is this exposure, combined with the assumption that fiscal resources for any bank bail-outs 
must come from national budgets, which has created the inter-linkage between state finances and 
banking systems which is the most dangerous feature of our current predicament.   
Past assessments of Italy’s level of high state indebtedness have often taken some comfort from 
the fact that “the debt is primarily internally financed”.  But in fact that very internal financing, 
especially to the extent that it is through the banking system, has created extreme vulnerability.  
If a Californian state bank held a high proportion of its liquid resources in Californian state 
bonds, nobody would assume that this made Californian state debt in some senses more 
sustainable, and it would be recognised that such an undiversified portfolio increases financial 
instability risks.  And conversely, if a larger proportion of Italian debt were held not by the 
Italian banking system, Italian households or other Italian institutions, but by investors outside 
Italy, that would reduce the likely downside effect of Italian debt restructuring on the Italian 
economy and on Italian banking system fragility.
5 
So Charles is quite right that the Maastricht Treaty, in attempting to constrain the risks involved 
in a multi-nation state currency union, focused too exclusively on state debt levels. 
6 But on what 
should we focus: state debt, total debt, or external debt?  I think we need to focus on all three and 
to think through the different implications of each.  (Exhibit 9) 
  We clearly need to focus on total debt levels, internal and external, government and 
private combined.  Because we have learned that debt burdens which legally are quite 
separate can in economic terms be closely correlated.  Once leverage across the whole 
economy has become high, it turns out to be incredibly difficult to reduce aggregate 
leverage rather than to simply shift it from one sector to another – deleveraging in the 
                                                            
5 What is true is that a high proportion of debt held internally may, for a period of time, make it easier to re-finance 
existing debt and to issue new debt, since internal debt providers, as a result of a home bias, may be willing to ignore 
potential solvency problems for longer than external investors.  Countries with higher proportions of debt held 
internally may therefore be less susceptible to temporary contagion and liquidity effects, and to the danger of 
irrational self-reinforcing cycles in which market concerns drive increasing debt servicing costs.  If and when debt 
solvency pressures do result in actual default/restructuring, however, this internal bias becomes a point of 
vulnerability rather than strength.  In addition, the very fact of a home behavioural bias, particularly if reinforced by 
regulators who require or encourage the banking system to hold greater debt, may make it more likely that state debt 
is able to grow to unsustainable levels in the first place 
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private sector producing an automatic deterioration in public finances, and some would 
argue a need to accept an increase of public deficits in order to avoid recession.  The 
Japanese experience over the last 20 years illustrates this dynamic (Exhibit 10).
7 
  But we need also to focus on external debt levels, or at least on their flow counterpart – 
current account imbalances – as important indicators of real wage disequilibria which 
may lead to future debt sustainability problems in either the state or private sectors. 
  But we must also focus on total state debt levels, internal or external, and particularly so 
in any country which does not have freedom in extremis to monetise its debt, a crucial 
difference between the internal debt burden of say Italy today versus Argentina in 1980.  
For a nation which cannot print its own money, a domestic debt burden can be as 
unsustainable as an external burden; and in these circumstance indeed, a high proportion 
of internally held debt, particularly if held by the banking system, can increase the 
country’s vulnerability to state debt default or haircuts. 
What is apparent therefore is that the Eurozone’s current construct – the Eurozone’s  answer to 
the questions Charles posed about the appropriate balance of supra-national and national 
responsibilities – is  an inadequate one, reflecting inadequate attention in advance of the 
Eurozone launch to the sui generis nature of the Eurozone – a zone in which nations are neither 
equivalent to completely independent countries with their own currency nor fully analogous to 
US states without their own currencies, but something in between and requiring specific 
institutional rules to make the system stable. 
It is the failure to address this sui generis character, and to construct fiscal and financial stability 
arrangements appropriate to this character, which helps explain the phenomenon that the 
Eurozone has both the lowest aggregate debt to GDP of the four major developed economy 
currency zones, and the highest average bond yields (Exhibit 11). 
Faced with the current predicament, there are two issues: 
  First how to get out of the position we should have never got into. 
  Second what is a better set of arrangements for the future? 
The former is of course the harder question.  But since Charles largely avoided it in his paper, I 
feel justified in doing likewise in response, except for two observations.  The first increasingly 
accepted, the second perhaps more controversial. 
  The first is that we have to recognise that some of the accumulated national debt levels of 
individual Eurozone countries exceed sustainable levels, and that if these debts remain 
denominated in Euros, i.e. if the countries do not leave the Eurozone and are therefore 
unable to consider monetisation options, some degree of restructuring/haircutting is 
inevitable.  A specific example of the wider point that Charles makes that in some 
                                                            
7 Richard Koo, “The Holy Grail of Macroeconomics, Lessons from Japan’s Great Recession”, makes a persuasive 
case that the increase in Japanese government debt as a % of GDP was both the naturally arising consequence of 
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circumstances there should be “partial default and restructuring” and that a system which 
does not allow for controlled restructuring in the face of economic realities will be a sub-
optimal one in both macro-economic and financial stability terms. 
  The second, that even if we focus on the currency blocks where the sovereign debt issuer 
is the currency issuer (Japan, UK, US) or even if we focussed on the total Eurozone debt 
burden ignoring the particular problems created by the national debt versus Euro currency 
split, we may in some cases face levels of debt as a percent of GDP which are very 
difficult to reduce through the processes of fiscal consolidation alone, without the helping 
hand of exceptional monetary measures which take us closer to debt monetisation. 
But those comments aside, what structure makes sense for the Eurozone for the long term?  What 
is increasingly agreed is that the general direction has to be towards a much greater degree of 
economic policy integration than put in place when the Eurozone was launched.  And in respect 
to such integration, the UK government in July signalled a significant shift from Britain’s 
historic approach – still clear that Britain will remain outside the Eurozone, but willing to accept 
and indeed encourage necessary integration within that zone. 
But the question is what degree of and what form of integration, and with what consequences for 
national authority over taxes, over expenditure and over public debt?  Let me suggest some 
contextual thoughts on the fiscal arrangements – but then focus on my key concern, the 
implications for financial stability arrangements (Exhibit 12).   
I think it is clear that total integration of tax and spend decisions, or even a division of 
responsibilities between federal and local level equivalent to US arrangements, will not emerge 
and indeed does not need to.  German tax payers are not going to take direct responsibility for 
paying Italian pensions.  And there is no reason why the Eurozone should not be characterised by 
significantly different levels of tax and spend as a percent of GDP, reflecting different and 
sustainable social choices (Exhibit 13).  High public spend as a percent of GDP is compatible 
with Eurozone membership and with constrained debt levels – as Finland illustrates, and as I am 
sure Sweden and Denmark would demonstrate if they were also in the Eurozone.  What needs to 
be disciplined is debt issuance not expenditure levels per se. 
But what is probably needed on the fiscal side is: 
  At least some degree of Eurozone level automatic fiscal stabilisation, implying some 
Eurozone direct tax revenues and expenditures which can vary with the economic cycle. 
  And some elements of countercyclical fiscal transfer from above trend to below trend 
states, a feature which would tend naturally to follow from feature 1. 
Such arrangements could, however, still leave national states responsible for the vast majority of 
tax and spend decisions.  The crucial question then becomes what will be their degrees of 
freedom in relation to debt finance? 
The key to designing a sensible way forward in that respect is, I suggest, a clear focus on 
Charles’ essential distinction between “full sovereigns” and “subsidiary sovereigns” and the debt 
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That distinction suggests some clear design principles (Exhibit14). 
  First that it is essential the debt issued by subsidiary sovereigns – by sovereigns which 
cannot in extremis monetise it away – is limited by strong political or preferably by 
market disciplines. 
  Second, that we need to de-couple the noxious interconnection between banking system 
and sovereign debt – by reducing national banking system exposure to subsidiary 
sovereign debt. 
  Third, that the issuance of common liability Eurobonds could bring major funding cost 
advantages, but that the scale of issue of Eurobonds needs to be subject to effective 
discipline. 
Those principles in turn, might suggest something like the arrangements outlined on this exhibit, 
(Exhibit 15) with: 
  Eurobonds issued as joint and several liabilities of Eurozone governments, funding 
national governments up to an equalised percentage of GDP, and with debt service 
contributions equalised as a percent of GDP. 
  National bonds issuable in addition, but clearly not jointly guaranteed, and clearly 
carrying a far greater degree of default/restructure risk, which should be accepted, as per 
Charles proposals, not as something catastrophic and unacceptable, but as a naturally 
present possibility in any coherent and market discipline system. 
Such proposals, from a public finance perspective, have now been put forward by several 
commentators in particular by Jacques Delpla and Jakob von Weizsäcker, in a pamphlet issued 
by Bruegel Policy Foundation.
8 
9  The specific point I would like to stress, however, is that for 
such proposals to work we would have to ensure that these different categories of debt were 
treated quite separately in bank capital and liquidity regulations, and in central bank operations. 
  Eurobonds would be extensively held by banks, favourably treated in liquidity regimes, 
and awarded low or even zero capital weights (when held by banks with predominantly 
Euro balance sheets), because they would be – in terms of nominal repayment – close to 
risk free.  They would be eligible collateral at the ECB, key instruments in which the 
                                                            
8“Eurobonds:  The Bluebond concept and its implication, Jacques Delpla and Jacob von Weizsäcker, Bruegel Policy 
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ECB would conduct open market operations, central to monetary policy transmission 
mechanisms, and they would be the asset purchased in any quantitative easing operations, 
and if ever necessary, in more explicit and permanent forms of debt monetisation. 
  By contrast national bonds should ideally be held entirely outside the banking system, not 
central to ECB operations, and with no potential for monetisation.  They would clearly 
need to pay a significant risk premium over Eurobonds, and one which would vary with 
perceptions of credit worthiness.  But that would be a useful discipline on excessive debt 
finance. 
Now of course, even to put up this possible ideal is to illustrate immediately how very far we are 
from it, and how incredibly difficult it would be to manage the transition.  We start with banks 
whose liquidity buffers are stuffed full of subsidiary sovereign debt.  So I am sure that what will 
actually emerge will be significantly different from this ideal, and will emerge only very slowly 
and torturously.  But it is important even when groping our way through the pragmatic 
compromises required to drag ourselves out of a bad position, to at least keep in mind desirable 
principles and objectives. 
And Charles has identified that one of the central principles of better financial stability design is 
that “risk weightings of all sovereigns cannot be zero” and that “the idea that sovereign debt is 
riskless, let alone sub-sovereign debt, has to go”. 
But I think we need to stress still more than Charles’ paper the importance of the “full sovereign” 
versus “subsidiary sovereign” distinction, and focus even more than Charles does on the dangers 
of the banking system/subsidiary sovereign interconnect.  Charles suggests at one point that 
“sovereign debt held by financial intermediaries of that same country might still be zero 
weighted”.  If we mean here “fully sovereign” debt then maybe yes, but if we mean “subsidiary 
sovereign” debt, then absolutely no.   
As Charles stresses not all sovereign debt is the same.  But the most essential distinction (Exhibit 
16) is between full sovereign debt issued by a money issuing authority, and subsidiary sovereign 
debt issued by a subsidiary sovereign with no currency issuing powers.  The failure to recognise 
that distinction drove one of the most crucial design faults of the Eurozone which has left us 
today with the worst combination of all. 
  With no equivalent of the full sovereign debt (ie., Eurobonds) which banks should hold as 
the ultimate liquid asset, and which market signals suggest would currently allow the 
Eurozone to raise money at very low rates. 
  And with unsustainable levels of subsidiary sovereign debt, held in large and dangerously 
undiversified portfolios by national banking systems. 
As best we can, we need to crawl towards a more coherent system.   
And to sum up, the need clearly to distinguish full sovereign and subsidiary sovereign debts, is 
one of four general themes that I suggest in response to Charles’ paper. BoE/NBER Conference "Globalisation in an Age of Crisis" 
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  First that the aggregate scale of all debt in the system – public and private combined – is 
a crucial potential driver of financial and macroeconomic instability. 
  Second, that one of the reasons why we should worry about high aggregate leverage is 
that once we have it, it is incredibly difficult to reduce, rather than just shift from one 
sector to another. 
  Third, that it is crucial for us to understand the interconnections between different 
sectoral or counterparty debt burdens, and the extent to which the sustainability is 
correlated. 
  And fourth, that in the sovereign arena, fully sovereign debt and subsidiary sovereign 
debt are very different things. 
 
 